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lN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent

vs.

Case No.

WALLACE DUNNIVAN,

12355

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by defendant-appellant,
Wallace Dunnivan, from a conviction of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Wallace Dunnivan, was convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953) at a jury trial
in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, the
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, presiding. The appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not more
than five years in the state prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment and
conviction of the district court that the defendant was
guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do
bodily harm.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Wallace Dunnivan and Peggy Dunnivan had previously been married, but at the time of the
incident of October 3, 1970, they were divorced. Mr. Dunnivan had been living with his former wife periodically for
the past sixteen months since his return from a term in
prison. Mr. Dunnivan admitted that he had beaten his
former wife on one occasion since he had recently been
living with her.
Mrs. Dunnivan, receiving money in the form of a welfare check, was left responsible for paying the bills and
expenses of the household. She had allowed her car to be
repossessed by a bank for being behind in her payments.
On October 2, 1970, she allowed her truck to be repossessed
by a bank also. The defendant was angered by the repossessions to the point that he testified, "Now I was mad. Naturally I was mad as I could be" (T. 99).
Defendant had an argument with his former wife about
the repossessions. The day after this argument the defendant returned to Mrs. Dunnivan's home in the evening to
get some money from his former wife. When asked what

•'
he wanted the money for, he stated, "I want you to go
down and get me a hundred dollars so I can take me and
my girl friend out and go drinking" (T. 23). He got extremely mad and told Mrs. Dunnivan that he hated her
'
that he thought she was stupid and that if she did not get
a hundred dollars for him he would kill her (T. 13, 23).
He also stated that he never hated anybody more than he
hated his former wife and that he never wanted to kill
anybody more than she (T. 12, 24).
Mrs. Dunnivan then left the house with some friends
"·ho had brought the defendant to the house so that she
might cash a check to get the money. Mrs. Dunnivan called
her father and returned with her father and two policemen
to her home.
While Mrs. Dunnivan was gone, the defendant found
both parts to a shotgun that were kept in the house and put
the gun together. He also loaded the weapon with a shell
and kept watch for Mrs. Dunnivan's return (T. 61, 62, 67).
He told his children to go to bed and that no matter what
happened, that he loved them (T. 62).
When Mrs. Dunnivan returned with her father, Mr.
Davis, and the two police officers, Mr. Dunnivan was asked
by Mr. Davis if he had threatened his daughter. Mr. Dunnivan answered, "Yes, I threatened to kill her, and I will do
it," or "Yes, and I will do it," acknowledging that he had
threatened her and renewing his threat or intent to kill her
(T. 73, 75, 85, 86).

The defendant then picked up the loaded shotgun and
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aimed it in the direction of Mrs. Dunnivan. Mrs. Dunnivan
testified that he had his finger on the trigger and that she
was "mighty gosh-awful scared" (T. 38, 43). Mr. Davis
quickly grabbed the gun from the defendant and forced the
weapon to the table.
Mrs. Dunnivan testified that she was aware the shotgun was in the house but the two parts were always kept
in separate places. She stated that to her knowledge the
shotgun parts were still in their separate places as short
as a week prior to the <lay the shotgun was used in threat·
ening her.
Defendant testified that he found the shotgun put together in a drawer low enough to be reached by the children
in the home. He testified that he became extremely angry
upon finding the shotgun within the reach of his children
(T. 104).
After the actions of Mr. Davis of disarming the defendant on October 3, 1970, the police officers took the defendant into custody and also examined the shotgun. It
was found to be loaded. The complaint was signed by one
of the police officers who witnessed the incident, Officer
Hazel (T. 49, 90, 91).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO
THE COURT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW
A JURY TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY.

A. The trial court properly denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss the case.
At the end of the presentation of the evidence by the
State, defendant's attorney made a motion to dismiss the
case (T. 91). At that point in the trial the following facts
(taken in a light most favorable to the defendant) appeared
to be uncontroverted.
Mrs. Dunnivan had allowed a car and a truck to be
repossessed (T. 18). Mr. Dunnivan had argued with Mrs.
Dunnivan about the repossessions on Friday, October 2nd
(T. 18). On Saturday, October 3rd, Mr. Dunnivan returned
home in the evening and tried to get a hundred dollars from
Mrs. Dunnivan so he could go out with his girl friend (T.
23, 66) . An argument took place where Mr. Dunnivan
said that if she did not get the hundred dollars for him he
would kill her (T. 13, 61). While Mrs. Dunnivan left to
get the money, Mr. Dunnivan made the children go into their
bedroom after which the twelve-year-old daughter Merlene
saw Mr. Dunnigan get both parts of the shotgun and the
shells and put the gun together and load it (T. 61).
Mr. Dunnivan waited in the kitchen for Mrs. Dunnivan
to return. When Mrs. Dunnivan arrived with Mr. Davis,
her father, and the two police officers, Mr. Dunnivan was
asked by Mr. Davis if he had threatened his daughter. Mr.
Dunnivan answered "Yes" (T. 34, 51, 73, 85) and proceeded to pick up the shotgun and aim it in the direction
of Mrs. Dunnivan (T. 37).
In spite of other evidence that was eventually pre-

sented in the course of the proceedings both favorable and
unfavorable to the defendant, the facts recited above appear
to be uncontroverted ·at the time the motion to dismiss the
case was presented by defendant's counsel. Even reading
these facts in the most favorable light to the defendant,
there was a showing of considerable evidence that (1)
there were threats showing an intent to do bodily harm;
(2) there was a direct act towards the commission of a
battery when Mr. Dunnivan raised the shotgun and pointed
it at Mrs. Dunnivan; and (3) the loaded shotgun provided
the actual present ability to accomplish the intended harm.
The evidence presented in the trial court specifically
meets the requirements for assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to do bodily harm. In Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1
(1953), assault is defined as "An unlawful attempt coupled
with a present ability to commit a violent injury on the
person of another." To this definition of assault Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-6 ( 1953) adds the specific intent element
of intent to do bodily harm and also the requirement of use
of a deadly weapon.
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P. 2d 1130 (1937)
the specific elements of the offense are set forth as "(1)
An assault; (2) use of a deadly weapon; and (3) an intent
to do bodily harm." Id. at 580, 65 P. 2d 113'3. A look at
cases further defining the elements of the offense reveal
that an unlawful attempt is made out whenever any act
done towards commission of a battery is shown. In State
v. Prince, 75 Utah 205, 284 P. 108 (1930), the court in
affirming a conviction for the crime of extortion said that
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there was no error in instructing the jury that a verbal
threat to commit extortion would be sufficient to constitute
"any act done" in the lesser offense of attempted extortion.
Certainly the threats of defendant, Dunnivan, and his
actions in pointing the gun at Mrs. Dunnivan were sufficient to constitute "any act done" towards committing a
battery.
Case law also shows that present ability should be
found in the case before us where the defendant used as a
deadly weapon a loaded shotgun. In a California case,
People v. Simpson, 134 Cal. App. 646, 25 P. 2d 1008 (1933),
the court said :
"We are of the opinion an automatic repeating
rifle which contains loaded cartridges in its magazine
may constitute a deadly weapon with which one may
have the present ability to commit violent injury
upon another person, by firing the weapon at him,
although it is first necessary to transfer a loaded
shell to the firing chamber by operating a lever."
Id. at 651, 25 P. 2d 1010. See also People v. Pearson,
150 Cal. App. 2d 811, 311 P. 2d 142 (1957).
The defendant Dunnivan had a loaded shotgun which
merely needed to be cocked before firing. The threat made
using this shotgun was made by a deadly weapon and actual present ability was clearly shown.
B. The evidence received in the court below was sufficient to allow a jury to find the defendant guilty.
The jury, as the ultimate trier of facts, had a reasonable basis upon which to base their determination of guilty.
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The jury alone was allowed to determine the weight to be
given the testimony of each witness. In addition to the
above-listed "uncontroverted facts" that were present at the
time defendant's counsel moved for dismissal, the following
facts were presented by testimony which could have been
accepted as a valid basis for the "guilty" determination
made by the jury.
Mr. Dunnivan got extremely mad when he learned that
Mrs. Dunnivan had allowed her car and truck to be repossessed (T. 99). He threatened to kill Mrs. Dunnivan,
stating that he never wanted to kill anybody more than
she (T. 13, 24). He told her if she did not get the hundred
dollars he wanted he would kill her (T. 13, 24, 61). After
Mrs. Dunnivan left, Mr. Dunnivan continued to pursue his
threat of killing his former wife as evidenced by his putting
the shotgun together and loading it, and by his telling the
children that no matter what happened he loved them (T.
61, 62).
Testimony as to the actual words spoken when Mr.
Davis confronted Mr. Dunnivan varied some from witness
to witness. However, all agree that Mr. Dunnivan said
"yes" that he had threatened Mrs. Dunnivan, and most
witnesses agreed that he also renewed that threat in their
presence (T. 34, 51, 73, 85, 106, 109). Mr. Dunnivan then
picked up the loaded gun and pointed it at Mrs. Dunnivan
(T. 37). Mr. Dunnivan had his finger on the trigger (T.

38).
The evidence and testimony available for the jury to
weigh and determine clearly supported their decision in

establishing guilt. The law in the State of Utfu.1 is that
"It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence
offered by the state is weak or strong, is in conflict or is
not controverted." State v. Green, 77 Utah 580, 589, 6 P.
2d 177, 181 (1931) . The jury also had a decided advantage
over the present court in weighing the sufficiency of evidence because of some extensive evidence presented visually
in the courtroom as the witnesses testified as to the events
that took place. Certainly the jury's impressions and determinations should be followed in light of the limitation
we have in only being able to read the transcript.

POINT II.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 C 0 RR E C TL Y
STATED THE LAW AND WAS PROPERLY
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
Appellant quotes at length from Criminal Law Review,
which is published in London and circulated throughout
the British Commonwealth in support of the proposition
that the standard for provocation should be based upon the
defendant's own temperament. This British article does
not properly represent the law as has been applied here in
the United States' jurisdictions. It in fact does not properly represent the legal position of the British system as
evidenced by British cases discussing the issue. Bedder v.
Dfrector of Public Prosecutions, 2 ALL E. R. 801 (1954).
The test for considerable provocation in assault is the
same test to be applied in other criminal offenses where
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provocation is allowed to act as a defense. This can be
shown in the case of People v. Albori, 97 Cal. App. 537,
275 P. 1017 (1929) where the test for provocation was
spelled out in an assault case and later followed in other
types of criminal cases. Of the reasonable man test in provocation, Albori states:
"A person may have a lively apprehension that
he is in imminent danger, and believes that his
apprehension is based on sufficient cause and supported by reasonable grounds; that such apprehension is reasonable and warranted from appearances
as they present themselves to him. If, however, he
acts on these appearances, he does so at his peril,
because the law leaves it to no man to be the ex-

clusive judge of the reasonableness of the appearances upon which he acts, but prescribes a standard

of its own, which is not only, did the person acting
on the appearances himself believe that he was in
deadly peril of his life or of receiving great bodily
harm, but would a reasonable man, situated as the

defendant was, seeing what he saw, and knowing
what he knew, be justified in believing himself in
danger?" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 544, 275 P.

1020.

Albori was cited and followed in People v. Fisher, 86
Cal. App. 2d 24, 194 P. 2d 116 ( 1948), where the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. It
was also followed in People v. Dawson, 88 Cal. App. 2d 85,
198 P. 2d 338 (1948), where the provocation defense was
brought up and defined in the context of justifiable homicide.
This line of California cases clearly states the reasonable man test and properly applies that test to all criminal
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offenses where the defense of provocation becomes relevant.
Cases in the federal courts have also recognized the
reasonable man test as being proper for considering the
extent of provocation required to establish the defense.
Bishop v. United States, 107 F. 2d 297 (App. D. C. 1939)
considered the following test in provocation relating to a
homicide:
"The test of sufficiency of such provocation is
that which would cause an ordinary man, a reasonable man, or an average man, to become so aroused.
. . . [I] t must be such provocation as would have
like effect upon the mind of a reasonable or average
man, causing him to lose self-control." Id; at 302.
The same court considered the question of provocation
again in Hart v. United States, 130 F. 2d 456 (App. D. C.
1942). Therein they state the holding in Bishop and follow
the same test.
The Utah case law conforms to the same tests that
have been applied in these other jurisdictions. In an early
case, State v. Kakarikos, 4·5 Utah 470, 146 P. 750 (1915),
an instruction was given relating to the matter of self-defense which stressed the "reasonableness" of such defense.
'
" ... [I]t must appear to the reasonable satisfaction
of the jury from the whole of the evidence that the
defendant at the time of the shooting had reasonable
cause to believe, that Regis was then about to kill
the defendant, or do him great bodily harm, and
that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe,
and did believe that there was immediate danger
" Id. at 485, 146 P. 756.

A later Utah case discussing the provocation defense
as it applies to sudden combats states as its guiding principle:
". . . [DJ id the combat together with all the facts
and circumstances that immediately preceded and
those that surrounded it provoke, enrage, annoy,
and confuse a reasonable man to such a degree that
he might be excused from the results of his acts."
State V. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 140, 185 P. 2d 738,
743 (1947).
It is clear from these Utah cases, the federal jurisdic-

tion and other state jurisdictions that the test to be applied
when considering whether there was a sufficient amount
of provocation to establish a defense, is that of the reasonable man. Therefore, Instruction No. 8 correctly stated the
law.
The portion of the jury mstruction relating to "abandoned or malignant heart" was properly submitted to the
jury. The transcript of the lower court proceedings does
show that there was evidence that might show the existence
of an "abandoned or malignant heart". Mr. Dunnivan
stated on different occasions how upset he was with his
wife. He said :
"Now I was mad.
could be" (T. 99).
*

*

Naturally I was mad as

*

"I am so mad now that I am fixing to blow my
stack ... I was so mad I couldn't see straight, and
I set there at the table and waited until she got

through, until she got back" (T. 104).
When these statements are read in light of the fact
that Mr. Dunnivan told his children that no matter what
happened, he still loved them, there is very real evidence
that Mr. Dunnivan's assault was not a chance happening
but a calculated plan (T. 62). The evidence is clear that
he threatened his wife and continued on a cou::-se of conduct
during her absence to accomplish the threat upon her return (T. 63, 62).
Because of the existence of these facts, the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury regarding an "abandoned
or malignant heart". Even without a clear showing of evidence related to this possible element of the crime of assault
with intent to do bodily harm, there existed enough evidence
to satisfy the jury determination of guilty under the basic
elements of the crime. Even if not supported by evidence,
the abandoned or malignant heart portion of the instruction would not prejudice the defendant and would constitute nothing more than harmless error. Jury Instruction
No. 8 was therefore properly submitted to the jury and
did not prejudice the defendant in any way.
POINT III.
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
THAT MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS.
The Record from the lower court contains the jury
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instructions in their enti1·ety. A reading of Instruction 18
indicates that the jury was properly instructed as to the
presumption of innocence ( R. 26).
"A person charged with :\ crime is presumed
to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence is
not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at
pleasure, but is a substantial, essential part of the
law and is binding upon the jury. This presumption
is a humane provision of the law, intended, sc far
as human agency is capable, to guard against the
danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
"The presumption of innocence must contmue
to prevail in the minds of the jury unless and until
the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the defendant. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled
to an acquittal" (R. 26).
The proper standards regarding the presumption of
innocence were correctly stated in this instruction, so that
the jury might properly be guided in reaching a just result.
Appellant contends that the instructions relating to
the presumption of innocence should have been incorporated
in Instruction No. 13, which describes the relationship between "assault with intent to do bodily harm" and "simple
assault" (R. 21). Such a contention is without merit when
considering the import of Instruction No. 23 (R. 31). It
states:
"These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be considered and construed as one connected whole. Each instruction should be read and
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understood in reference to and
a part of the entire charge and not as though any one sGntence or
instruction separately were intended to state the
whole law of the case upon any particalar point.
Moreover, the order in which the instructions are
given has no significance as to their relative importance" (R. 31).
The impact of this instruction is that the jury must
consider the complete jury instructions as an mtegrated
\·,,hole, relating each instruction to the other instructions
given. Specifically, the jury must consider the presumption
of innocence instructions as relating to the instructions
designating the relevant crime, or elements of the crime.
The instruction properly stated the presumption of innocence and how it must apply. As such, there was no prejudice resulting from the jury instructions.
The trial court judge properly instructed the jury as
to the lesser included offense of simple assault. State v.
Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P. 2d 1130 (1937) requires that
when there is a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon the jury should also be instructed as to the crime of
simple assault. See also State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372,
463 P. 2d 811 (1970). It is a necessary element of the
greater offense. The defendant Dunnivan cannot claim
prejudice for having the lesser offense instructions submitted to the jury because they act to give the defendant
the benefit of the doubt if the greater offense is not clearly
established. The jury found the defendant Dunnivan guilty
of the greater offense and the defendant should not now
be allowed to claim prejudice after the jury was properly

instructed as to the different offenses and has determined
the defendant to be guilty of the greater offense.
Instruction No. 13 was correctly submitted to the jury
and carried with it the necessary presumption of innocence
as incorporated from the jury instructions as a whole.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in the trial court was sufficient
for the jury to find the defendant guilty. There was ample
evidence for the jury to be instructed on the "abandoned
and malignant heart" portion of the assault with intent to
do bodily harm statute. The jury was properly instructed
as to the standard for provocation and as to the presumption of innocence and where it should apply.
For these reasons, the respondent would ask that the
conviction in the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
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